Trump's bright anti-China idea begins to dim

The Quad, a strategic security dialogue between the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, once hailed as a bold geopolitical response to China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, is now showing signs of strain. Originally envisioned as a bulwark of democratic cooperation, the initiative’s cohesion is now under pressure from within, notably from the very country that resuscitated it in 2017 under then-President Donald Trump.

Trump’s decision to cancel his planned participation in the upcoming Quad summit in India , reportedly due to worsening personal and diplomatic ties with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is the latest and most visible signal of the grouping’s internal rift. According to a report by The New York Times, Trump’s move follows a diplomatic fallout with Modi, despite the Indian leader extending a formal invitation after the G7 summit. The optics and comments from Modi's visit to SCO Summit at Tianjin in China suggest India is shifting away from the US and towards China. Even Japan and Australia seem to be revising their stance.

The Quad was born out of humanitarian collaboration in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when the four nations came together to coordinate disaster relief. It re-emerged in 2017, amid rising concerns about China’s expanding economic and military footprint in the region. Trump, then in his first term, strongly advocated for the Quad’s revival, positioning it as a core element of his administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

However, during his second term, Trump’s increasingly transactional and unpredictable foreign policy has begun to unravel the delicate diplomatic balance within the grouping. His combative economic stance, unilateral trade measures and arm-twisting tactics have introduced new tensions, not just with adversaries but also with long-standing allies.

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The reluctant partners
India’s importance to the Quad cannot be overstated. As the only member sharing a land border with China, India serves as the grouping’s strategic anchor in the region. Yet India’s approach to China has evolved. Prime Minister Modi’s participation in the SCO Summit in Tianjin, where he held a bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, signals India’s desire to recalibrate ties with Beijing despite ongoing border tensions.

Modi’s outreach to China contrasts with the coolness in US-India ties. Trump’s erratic diplomacy and disregard for institutional consensus have alienated key leaders, including Modi, who had once found ideological common ground with Trump’s assertive posturing. The cancellation of Trump’s India visit underscores how personal and policy-level disconnects are now feeding into broader geopolitical recalibrations.

Australia, too, finds itself in a difficult position. Once a vocal supporter of the Quad and of Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy, Australia is now grappling with the economic fallout of Trump’s protectionist agenda. The imposition of a 10% tariff on Australian exports, despite a longstanding free trade agreement, and a universal 50% tariff on steel and aluminium have hit the Australian economy. More recently, Trump’s threat to impose a 250% tariff on pharmaceuticals has further escalated tensions.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s July visit to Beijing was more than a symbolic reset; it was a calculated move to strengthen economic ties with China, Australia’s largest trading partner, while maintaining a cautious eye on strategic competition. The fact that Trump has not found time to meet with Albanese since he has been sworn in is a clear indication of the cooling diplomatic ties.

Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, speaking ahead of Modi’s recent trip to Japan and China, criticised Trump’s tariff policies in a thinly veiled rebuke. While she avoided direct commentary on US-India relations, she made it clear that Australia does not support tariffs and believes in openness as a path to economic growth, a subtle but clear divergence from Trump’s America First rhetoric.

Even Japan, often the most aligned with the US in strategic forums, now seems to be recalculating its position. Although it has reached a trade agreement with the US, Tokyo has been vocal about its concerns over Washington’s strong-arm tactics. The cancellation of Japanese trade negotiator Ryosei Akazawa’s visit to the US just before Modi’s trip to Japan underscores the friction. The visit was meant to finalise the proposed $550 billion Japanese investment package in the US, potentially easing the impact of Trump’s tariffs. Instead, its abrupt postponement revealed Japan’s unease with Trump’s approach.

At the same time, Tokyo has started engaging more openly with China. Recent signs of a thaw include resumed trade, relaxed travel restrictions and bilateral dialogues. While mutual mistrust on strategic issues persists, Japan is willing to hedge its bet when the US has turned transactional.

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Quad drifting without direction?
The Quad was always more of a strategic alignment than a formal alliance. Its informal, non-binding nature allowed for flexibility but also made it vulnerable to shifts in national priorities and leadership styles. Trump’s first term had provided the political impetus to revive the Quad as a geopolitical counterweight to China. But his second term is now characterized by erratic leadership, inward-looking policies and a tendency to alienate even close allies.

With all three of America’s Quad partners increasingly uneasy, and all of them independently engaging with China, the grouping appears to be adrift. The absence of Trump from the upcoming summit, coupled with rising intra-group tensions, suggests that the Quad’s future may be less about confronting China and more about managing the fallout from US unpredictability.

As India, Japan and Australia hedge their bets, the fundamental premise of the Quad, strategic unity in the face of Chinese assertiveness, is being quietly but steadily undermined. In the end, it may be Trump's own policies, not Chinese diplomacy, that do the most damage to his once bright anti-China idea.